İlhan Fakılı and Beşiktaş's Left Wing: A Call-Up From Where Nobody Was Looking

İlhan Fakılı and Beşiktaş's Left Wing: A Call-Up From Where Nobody Was Looking When Gregory Proment admitted he had no idea İlhan Fakılı had been called up to the Turkish national team, what made me pause was not the surprise of an old coach. It was the gap behind it. A man who once stood on the touchline coaching Fakılı at Clermont, who once dedicated private sessions to fixing the boy's finishing, was caught off guard by the very call-up itself. If the old teacher could not see it coming, how many people following Turkish football truly understood where Fakılı plays, and why he was called? I have grown used to this kind of mismatch. When the stands are empty, the match begins to speak its real language. When the roars disappear, the only thing left is data and positioning. And with Fakılı, it is the data — not the goal tally — that is drawing his true portrait. In the summer of 2026, when V.League and the European leagues were suspended, I sat in Nha Trang and learned to listen to football through numbers. I realized that without noise, tactical details become clearer. That lesson repeats here: a call-up never tells only a story of form. It tells a story of a gap in a squad, of a system missing exactly the type of player this young man provides. CONTEXT: A PLAYER GROWING FASTER THAN THE WAY PEOPLE LOOK İlhan Fakılı rose through Clermont's youth system, where Gregory Proment worked directly with him. At 47, Proment has enough experience not to praise a player merely out of politeness. The fact that he devoted time to answering in detail about a former student shows how much he truly cares about Fakılı. According to Proment, when Fakılı first took the field under him, the boy's talent was immediately obvious. He possessed good technique and dribbling ability, despite being very young. Proment said plainly: Fakılı has all the sporting and human qualities needed to succeed quickly. That is no small assessment, because in football, a coach declaring a young player fully equipped usually only comes after that player has proven something. Fakılı's move to Beşiktaş came with an impressive scoring start. That start is why the story about him became more notable. But Proment focused on another detail — the training process before that start happened. He revealed that at Clermont, the coaching staff had to work privately with Fakılı on his finishing inside the box and his decision-making on the pitch. Those were the early weaknesses of a young player who was otherwise very strong in technique and dribbling. This is worth noting. In the usual narrative, a young player scoring at a big club is described as an explosive talent. But Fakılı's story is the story of a constructed player. He does not score because of a miracle. He scores because someone sat down with him and repeated finishing situations until it became reflex. At national team level, a call-up often reflects the head coach's needs more than a reward for form. That is the key point most commentary skips. When a national team calls up a young player, the real question is not how many goals he has scored, but which gap he fills. I have followed many similar cases from the perspective of someone raised in Germany but writing for Vietnamese audiences. The common thread among young wingers who get misjudged is this: people ask how many goals they score, when the right question is how much space they open. That is the difference between a winger who scores and a winger who makes an entire attack run. ANALYSIS: WHY THE LEFT WING, AND WHY NOW What Proment said about Fakılı's correct position is the most valuable part of the entire conversation. He stated that Fakılı is an intelligent player who can comfortably adapt to different systems. But his highest output comes when he plays on the left wing, close to the touchline, in 4-3-3, 4-2-3-1, or 4-4-2 structures. This is not a generic remark about a flank. It is a technical specification. The left wing, close to the touchline, in a team with a strong attack — that is the environment that lets Fakılı maximize his dribbling and his improved decision-making. A player who starts from dribbling and technique, when placed centrally, often loses the space to use his strengths. When placed too high inside the box, he loses time to observe. The left wing near the line is the ideal space: it gives him a wide view, an opponent to dribble past, and time to decide. The three shapes Proment mentioned — 4-3-3, 4-2-3-1, 4-4-2 — share one thing: they all create a left corridor with a player tasked with stretching the width. This is the technical detail the media rarely mentions. People speak of the left wing as a fixed position, but in modern football, the left wing is a function. In 4-3-3, it is usually a winger inclined to drift inside. In 4-2-3-1, it is a wide midfielder involved in both defending and attacking. In 4-4-2, it is a classic wide midfielder who must hold width across both phases. Proment saying Fakılı delivers best in all three shapes, provided he plays near the touchline, implies this player is not the modern inverted winger type. He is a traditional wide player who needs space and needs an opponent. This matters when analyzing how he will be used at national team level. The finishing-training detail deserves a closer look. Proment said that at Clermont, Fakılı lacked finishing in front of goal and lacked quality in decision-making moments. Those are two typical weaknesses of a technically gifted young player: good at dribbling but unsure when to pass or shoot, or shooting without enough composure. Proment's staff dedicated private sessions to improving his finishing in front of goal. The problem with great dribblers often lies in having too many options and too little discipline to choose quickly. Private finishing sessions do not just improve the shot; they build a reflex. When a player repeats finishing situations, he learns to decide faster. That is why Proment said the decision-making mechanism and choice quality visibly improved over time. And that is also why the scoring start at Beşiktaş did not surprise him. This matters because it refutes a common assumption: that attacking players score because of innate talent. In reality, at Fakılı's level, finishing is constructed. Talent lies in technique, in dribbling, in processing speed. Finishing is the result of directed training. A club with a good development system turns a great dribbler into a goalscorer. Fakılı's Clermont story is proof of that. Proment's claim that Fakılı has already adapted to Vincenzo Italiano's system signals that this player is not raw material needing a long runway. Tactical intelligence is the decisive factor. In modern football, an attacker needs not only technique but an understanding of his position within a defensive and transition structure. That is why quick adaptation to Italiano's system matters: it shows Fakılı is not a gift for the future, but a player for the present. And here is the point I want to emphasize: the true value of a winger is not in the number of goals, but in whether he holds width and creates space for others. Proment stressed that Beşiktaş's attack will feed each other, that Fakılı produces as much as his teammates. That is a subtle way of stating a tactical truth: in a strong attack, a winger's value may lie in what he creates for others, not only in what he does himself. This also matches how the transfer market works. Big clubs do not buy a player just because he scores a lot at a mid-tier club. They buy him because he solves a structural problem. If Fakılı is the type who holds width and opens space, his value will not be measured in goals, but in the goals his attack produces because of him. WHERE I COULD BE WRONG This is where I must ask where I could be wrong. My biggest assumption is that the call-up reflects Fakılı's quality. But a national team call-up sometimes only reflects a shortage of options. If Turkey is short on left-wingers, calling up a rising young player is not necessarily recognition — it could be necessity. And if Fakılı was called because of need, the real question is not whether he deserves it, but whether he can hold up when the quality of opponents rises. Second assumption: that the left wing near the touchline is the best position for Fakılı. Proment asserted that at club level, but the national team is a different environment. Higher tempo, shorter processing time, more experienced full-backs. A player who thrives on the left wing in a 4-3-3 at Beşiktaş can be neutralized against a national team that organizes its wing defense well. The correct position at club level does not automatically become the correct position at national team level. Third assumption: the prediction that top European clubs will soon track Fakılı. That kind of prediction sounds like a generous compliment. But most young players with a good scoring start are not immediately pursued by big clubs. The transfer market runs on patience, not reflexes. A good debut season is a signal, not a summons from Europe. And the assumption I consider most dangerous: that the qualities Proment praised — technique, dribbling, adaptation — will automatically convert into output at a higher level. Many young players look excellent at a mid-tier club, only to vanish when tempo and pressure rise. Good dribbling does not protect you from a defender who reads the game better. Quick adaptation does not protect you from an opponent system organized to neutralize you. I do not trust my eyes; I trust what my eyes cannot see. And what my eyes cannot see here, after all the praise, is a full explanation of what Fakılı will do when Beşiktaş's attack no longer feeds him. A player fed by the stars around him will always look better than reality. The question is only answered when those stars are absent. WHAT I AM BETTING ON So what am I betting on? I believe that in the coming months, Fakılı's true yardstick will not be his goal count, but the number of times he stays in the correct left-wing position when the match turns difficult. If he holds width and keeps deciding quickly, he stays with the national team. If he drifts inside and disappears from big matches, then the call-up is a moment, not a career. The man on the bench sees most clearly who is acting. And in this case, the old teacher saw it most clearly before all of us. I may be wrong about Fakılı's readiness. But I will not be wrong about how he is used: left wing, near the touchline, or nothing at all. And if I am right, the most notable thing about Fakılı will not be the goals he scores, but the goals he makes others score.